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Abstract
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a relatively new phenomenon in Kazakh-
stan – their development began in 2005 in the transport and energy sectors. Ini-
tially sluggish growth transformed into rapid PPP deployment from 2016 to 2019 
when hundreds of PPPs were launched in many industries (infrastructure, hospi-
tals, schools), which was in sharp contrast to just a handful of PPPs formed prior 
to 2016. Rapid PPP deployment raised deep concerns whether the government’s 
supporting schemes and PPP launch procedures are appropriate and whether they 
may backfi re for the government in the form of increasing debt. Th is paper aims to 
investigate the enablers and implications of accelerated PPP formation. Th e study 
is based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with a range of actors in the fi eld, 
including PPP operators (railroad, energy company, kindergarten), regional and lo-
cal governments, national and regional PPP centres, lawyers and private investors, 
which aff orded an opportunity to mitigate bias in opinions. Th e study has identifi ed 
three principal enablers: simplifi ed procedures for a PPP launch, pressure exert-
ed on regional governments, and extensive government fi nancial support to PPPs. 
By making use of agency theory, property rights theory and the value-for-money 
concept, the paper off ers a conceptualisation of rapid PPP growth in Kazakhstan 
in recent years and argues that growth was disproportionally fast and unintended. 
Policy implications include a need to re-establish the value-for-money approach to 
PPP formation, a signifi cant increase in government liabilities to PPPs, and a mis-
conception regarding the role of PPP collaborative governance.
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1. Introduction
Public-private partnership (PPP) development in Western Europe is oft en associ-
ated with New Public Management (NPM) (Grimsey and Lewis 2004; Wettenhall 
2005). Within the NPM movement that aimed to reform the State and improve 
its effi  ciency, active PPP deployment shows signifi cant interest of many Europe-
an nations toward the greater use of the private sector’s funds, its technology and 
its management expertise for the provision of traditional public services in infra-
structure (toll roads, railroads, seaports, energy generation and transmission, waste 
utilisation, water purifi cation) and the social sphere (hospitals, childcare facilities, 
stadiums, spas) (Osborne 2000).
Aligned with the NPM, partnerships, in the form Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI), have become an important part of the government’s strategy for deliver-
ing modern, high quality services and lowering the costs in the United Kingdom 
since the early 1990s (Akintoye et al. 2003, Wettenhall 2005). Since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, hundreds of PPPs, with the investment amounting to billions 
of pounds, were deployed in the UK, followed by many European economies, 
including Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
(Akintoye et al. 2003; Yescombe 2007). PPPs also became popular in Eastern Eu-
ropean nations, such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, who 
started deploying PPPs at the end of the 1990s. “Triggered by the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, the economic transition of these nations to a market 
system naturally incorporated PPP deployment as part of a pro-market agenda 
aimed at free enterprise development, wide use of market tools and reversing his-
torical government dominance” (Mouraviev and Kakabadse 2017, 57). A shortage 
of budget funding became the single most important reason for engaging private 
fi rms in public-service delivery (Urio 2010).
In Kazakhstan, an ex-Soviet nation in Central Asia, PPPs are a relatively new 
phenomenon, having grown out of the transport and energy sectors in 2005. A 
number of projects were launched on an experimental basis, as back then there were 
no legal provisions governing PPP implementation. While a range of PPP meanings 
and approaches as to how to understand partnerships are available (Mouraviev and 
Kakabadse 2016), this paper views a PPP as a contractual type of “cooperation be-
tween public and private actors with a durable character in which actors develop 
mutual products and / or services and in which risks, costs and profi ts are shared” 
(Klijn and Teisman 2003, 137). Th e PPP principal features include resource- and 
risk-sharing, asset construction or renovation by a private-sector partner using pri-
vate-sector funding, and subsequent public-service provision with the use of this 
asset over the long term, during which a private operator recovers its capital costs 
and operating expenses (Mouraviev and Kakabadse 2016). Another important PPP 
feature is that upon project completion an asset (a constructed or renovated fa-
cility, such as a bridge or a stadium) should remain in the public domain, rather 
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than in private hands. Output specifi cations in the form of the volume and quality 
parameters of a public service, rather than input specifi cations (e.g. what materials 
should be used or how work should be organised) are also features that distinguish 
PPPs from other forms of government-business collaboration. Th ese features show 
that a PPP is very diff erent from a service contract, when the government hires a 
private fi rm to build and maintain a facility and pays service fees according to the 
signed contract. While a PPP is a form of public procurement in its broad meaning, 
partnerships are substantially diff erent from government purchasing, as asset con-
struction and public-service provision using this asset are at the partnerships’ core.
In 2006, the law on concessions was passed, marking an important step for-
ward in creating the legal framework for PPPs in the nation (Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan “On Concessions” 2006). Th is law’s integration with others in Kazakh-
stan’s legislation was not always successful, although undoubtedly the law gave an 
impetus to the country-wide eff ort to promote the PPP concept.
Th is work was largely driven by the national PPP Centre created by the gov-
ernment in 2008 under the auspices of the Ministry of the National Economy. Th e 
centre facilitated PPP development by identifying opportunities for PPP formation 
in diff erent sectors, assisting interested parties with preparing project documenta-
tion, designing standardised agreements and other documents for future projects, 
and consulting government staff  and investors on how to arrive at decisions on 
prospective PPPs (Kazakhstan’s PPP Centre 2020). Over several years, the centre 
created a large volume of template documents that could be used in PPP formation, 
conducted training on a regular basis, compiled a database of projects suitable for 
implementation in the PPP form, and put forward many suggestions for the gov-
ernment regarding improving the national PPP legislation and regulatory regime.
A host of new contracts was signed between 2007 and 2011 to launch PPPs in 
the energy sector, railroad transportation sector, and one in the social sector for the 
construction and operation of kindergartens. All projects were in the concession 
form, making use of the 2006 concessions law, with project terms ranging from 
14 to 28 years (Mouraviev and Kakabadse 2017). However, lacking feasibility for 
successful implementation, most of these projects were then put on hold and sub-
sequently shut down, although the exact reasons were never disclosed (Mouraviev 
et al. 2012).
Kazakhstan’s PPP development was relatively slow. Over the decade from 2005 
to 2015, the nation designed PPP legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks. In 
addition, the country developed its approaches at approximately the same time as 
neighbouring Russia, although at a slightly slower pace, which allowed Kazakhstan 
to assess the Russian experience. While in 2005 Russia did not have any PPPs, in 
2011 their number increased to 204, and in 2015 to 595 (Mouraviev and Kakabadse 
2017). Th e Russian experience showed that PPP deployment could be accelerated 
and accomplished at a much faster pace, particularly at the regional and local levels. 
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In contrast, Kazakhstan’s PPP development appeared sluggish, with only three on-
going concessions by the end of 2015. Th ese include a railroad in East Kazakhstan, 
an inter-regional electrical grid in the Northern part of the country, and an interna-
tional airport in the city of Aktau. All three projects were and still are highly visible, 
as they are the fi rst set of projects in operation since the beginning of PPP formation 
in the period 2005 – 2008.
Th e stalled growth of partnerships in Kazakhstan led to the commonly shared 
view that an existing 2006 concessions law could not eff ectively serve the coun-
try’s needs for PPP development. A new, more general law that would cover many 
aspects of PPPs was required. In 2015, amid embedded expectations of changes 
needed to facilitate the nation’s PPP development, Kazakhstan passed a law on PPPs 
(Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ 2015), while 
the 2006 law on concessions remains in eff ect.
Subsequently, the growth of PPPs in the nation signifi cantly accelerated. From 
2016 to 2019, more than 700 PPP contracts were signed, with 166 in 2017, 304 in 
2018, and 277 in 2019 (Atameken 2019; Matayev 2020). In contrast with the three 
PPPs successfully deployed prior to 2015, this impressive progress requires expla-
nation and refl ection.
Although an accelerated PPP development rate from 2016 to 2019 is generally 
associated with the adoption of the 2015 PPP law, the details of what exactly trig-
gered widespread formation are missing. Th is paper aims to investigate the drivers 
that facilitated extensive PPP formation and to identify implications of these drivers 
and the large-scale PPP growth. Th e paper intends to answer the following research 
questions:
RQ1: What are the enablers of extensive widespread PPP deployment in Kazakh-
stan in the period 2016 – 2019?
RQ2: What are the implications of rapid PPP development for the government and 
investors ?
Shedding light on what facilitated accelerated PPP deployment in Kazakhstan 
would allow policymakers, government workers, investors, and the academic com-
munity to learn from the nation’s experience and assess where Kazakhstan’s changes 
in PPP development stand in relation to best practice.
Th e paper is organised as follows. Th e next section off ers the literature review, 
aft er which a section provides details of the conceptual lens through which the pa-
per views PPP deployment. Th is is followed by a section on methodology. Th ere 
is then an outline and discussion of the study’s results, before the concluding part 
draws insights into the application of theories and the implications for the govern-
ment, investors and PPP governance.
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2. Literature review
Th is section reviews the literature on PPP development in parts of ex-Soviet space, 
particularly drawing on the context similar to that of Kazakhstan. Th e review’s fo-
cus is explained by the signifi cant impact of economic, political, cultural and budget 
realities in selected countries on the policy decision to use PPPs as a method of pub-
lic-service delivery by the private companies. From this perspective, it is most appro-
priate to compare Kazakhstan’s PPP experience with that of Russia as the contexts of 
these two ex-Soviet nations have many commonalities (Mouraviev and Kakabadse 
2017). Russia is Kazakhstan’s neighbour and economic partner, and the pathways of 
PPP development, as well as the general economic transformation in both nations, 
have been aligned with each other since 1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated. 
Another ex-Soviet nation that aims to advance PPPs is Ukraine (Soloviov 2017), 
although it used a diff erent pattern of economic development, and therefore the 
context and the progress in building legal and institutional frameworks for partner-
ships are diffi  cult to compare with those in Kazakhstan and Russia.
Other ex-Soviet nations also attempted to create a legal framework and set up 
governing institutions, but the actual PPP deployment is still in its infancy (Urio 
2010). Th is refers to Moldova, where the Concessions Law was passed in 1995 and 
the PPP Law was adopted in 2008, although progress is slow and limited, and the 
active, operational PPPs are hard to fi nd; Georgia, where the PPP law was approved 
in 2018; and Armenia, where a new PPP legislation was approved in 2019 (PPP 
Knowledge Lab 2021). Other nations, including Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan, have not yet adopted any PPP-specifi c legislative acts and are at the 
stage of the initial discussions about whether PPP is a suitable mechanism for them.
Th e literature on PPP development in ex-Soviet countries elucidates two prin-
cipal themes, including (a) the meaning of a PPP and (b) the reasons for PPP de-
ployment.
(a) Th e meaning of a PPP: As PPP is a novel concept for these countries, to which 
they turned their attention only at the beginning of the 21st century, defi ning a 
PPP appeared to be a challenging task that the literature debate refl ects.
(b) Th e reasons for PPP deployment: Th is theme comprises two parts: one focuses 
on the general rationale behind the PPP use, and the other investigates selected 
contextual reasons that justify PPP deployment in a country.
In addition to these two broad themes, the literature sheds light on a range of 
narrowly focused topics in the specifi c settings of a country. Th ese topics include 
risk management (Mouraviev and Kakabadse 2013), stakeholder value management 
(Mouraviev and Kakabadse 2015a), methods of PPP launch (Charman and Narbaev 
2017), PPP contractual arrangements (Urio 2010; Maslova 2015), aspects of the le-
gal and institutional frameworks (Maslova and Yushkov 2017; Soloviov 2017), and 
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sectoral matters, such as case studies in transport, the energy sector and healthcare. 
Th ere is also an emergent literature that discusses PPPs that work across national 
borders (e.g. Maslova and Sokolov 2020). While these publications are an important 
contribution to the body of knowledge about PPPs in ex-Soviet space, a review of 
these context-specifi c matters is beyond this paper’s scope. Literature appraisal in 
relation to two principal themes is provided below.
Th e meaning of a PPP. Within this theme, the literature off ers a wide spectrum 
of opinions that could be categorised by the defi nition’s scope. Th e fi rst, prevailing, 
category is an all-inclusive perspective on a PPP as any form of collaboration of the 
public and private sectors (Kabashkin 2010;  Varnavskiy et al. 2010; Pankratov 2010; 
Firsova 2012). Th e underpinning argument is that a PPP concept, in the view of 
many authors, emerged as a range of methods to overcome the historically formed 
lack of trust between the government and private business, which in turn stems 
from the government dominance in the Soviet economy that allowed almost no pri-
vate property and private enterprise (Kabashkin 2010; Varnavskiy 2011). As a result 
of this broad conceptualisation, many kinds of cooperation between the public and 
private sectors are considered to be a PPP including special economic zones and in-
vestment contracts with participation of the federal government agencies (Varnavs-
kiy et al. 2010). Since the beginning of the 21st century, this perspective was adopted 
by the Russian government and refl ected in the 2005 law on concessions (Federal 
Law #115-FZ of the Russian Federation “On concessionary agreements” 2005). A 
decade later this perspective was also enshrined in Kazakhstan’s legislation in the 
form of the 2015 PPP law (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Public-Private 
Partnership” 2015).
Th e second category includes opinions that, regardless of the nature of an ac-
tivity, a PPP is a contract between two or more parties and, therefore, has to be 
considered chiefl y from the legal perspective, i.e. as a set of rights and obligations 
of each party. Th is perspective was and still is popular in both Kazakhstan and Rus-
sia, particularly among those academics and practitioners who have an education-
al background in law (Chikanayev 2015; Popondopulo and Shevelyova 2015). Th e 
implication of this approach is that scholars contend that any kind of issues with 
PPPs is a result of legal omissions in a partnership contract or a refl ection of imper-
fections in the existing national legal framework (Maslova 2015; Chikanayev 2017). 
Due to focusing on PPP contractual terms, these authors do not usually investigate 
the management aspects, such as incentives, risk mitigation or partner interaction.
Th e literature in the ex-Soviet space does not pay proper attention to the 
criterion used for PPP formation in the industrialised economies, which is val-
ue-for-money (VfM) (Osborne 2000; Hodge and Greve 2005). Although this crite-
rion does not directly defi ne a PPP, it explains why a PPP exists and what it needs to 
achieve (Grimsey and Lewis 2004). In the UK, the government defi nes VfM as “the 
optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fi tness for purpose) of 
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the good or service to meet the user’s requirement. Th e term whole-of-life is used 
to refer to the lifecycle of the good or service. VfM is not the choice of goods and 
services based on the lowest cost bid” (Her Majesty’s Treasury 2006, 7). Th e quality 
of service must be factored in the assessment of PPP costs to make sure that lower 
cost is not accompanied by lower service quality (Hodge et al. 2010; Delmon 2013).
In contrast, much of the literature in Kazakhstan and Russia is silent on the sit-
uation that PPPs need to deliver VfM, and authors replaced the VfM criterion with 
another parameter – the project’s social signifi cance as a criterion for its approval 
as a PPP (Azizov 2009; Yeshimova 2019). However, what exactly social signifi cance 
means and why one project (e.g. the construction and operation of a stadium) may 
be viewed as more signifi cant than the other (e.g. the construction and operation of 
a school) remains unexplained. To summarise, the gap in the extant literature about 
Kazakhstan and Russia is in the way how PPPs are conceptualised – either as a 
broad range of almost any forms that allow the public and private sectors to collab-
orate, or as a legally binding contract between the parties. Only a small number of 
publications discuss a PPP as a set of arrangements complemented by management 
practice and partner interaction (Mouraviev et al. 2012; Mouraviev and Kakabadse 
2017), while much of the literature is silent about this perspective on partnerships.
Th e reasons for PPP deployment. Th e second theme illuminated in the litera-
ture overlaps with the fi rst and oft en draws on the PPP defi nition that a researcher 
adopts. Th is theme focuses on the reasons underpinning PPP deployment (Var-
navskiy et al. 2010). As most academics and practitioners in Kazakhstan and Russia 
adopt a stance that PPPs contribute and strengthen public-private collaboration, 
rather than having to deliver value-for-money, they oft en justify PPP deployment 
(and the overall government PPP policy) by pointing to the shortage of specifi c 
public services (Kabashkin 2010). Many developing economies including Kazakh-
stan and Russia are characterised by the outdated infrastructure that requires a ma-
jor overhaul and signifi cant investment, and the authors draw on these needs by 
emphasising two principal reasons that facilitate PPP deployment: (a) an acute lack 
of public services, which governments cannot overcome at the present time or even 
in the long term, and (b) an opportunity to attract the private sector funding for in-
vestment in infrastructure and, ultimately, for the private delivery of public services 
(Pankratov 2010; Mouraviev 2012).
Th e perspective adopted by most researchers, which appears to be narrowly 
focused on the context-specifi c reasons for PPP deployment and which pays little 
or no attention to VfM that a PPP has to deliver regardless of the contextual needs, 
refl ects a certain bias in the literature – lack of appreciation of the VfM concept. An 
unbalanced view of PPPs, in which disadvantages (particularly the higher cost of 
public services to society in those cases when VfM cannot be achieved) are down-
played or sometimes completely disregarded, leads to the acceptance of PPPs as 
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a universal mechanism to solve any kinds of economic problems (Mouraviev and 
Kakabadse 2014a).
Th ere is no doubt that in developing nations there is high demand for a larger 
volume and better quality of public services at the local, regional and / or national 
levels, such as demand for clean water, healthcare or transportation services (Urio 
2010). However, the argument emphasising context-specifi c needs for essential ser-
vices cannot automatically override the fundamental reason for PPP deployment 
used in other, mainly OECD, nations, i.e. value-for-money. Th is is because VfM en-
sures (or at least aims to ensure) effi  cient resource allocation by comparing the PPP 
cost with the cost of government in-house public-service delivery. Extensive expe-
rience across the world shows that, without using VfM as a main criterion for PPP 
deployment, PPPs are more expensive to society than government public-service 
provision, which means that effi  cient resource allocation is compromised (Moura-
viev and Kakabadse 2014a; 2017).
To summarise, the literature about Kazakhstan and Russia is silent about the 
links between the context-specifi c PPP drivers and the principal driver, which is the 
PPPs’ ability to deliver value-for-money. It is not surprising that this gap in the lit-
erature has led to a view that public policy should focus on accelerated PPP deploy-
ment because this way partnerships might deliver the much-needed public services 
faster (Firsova 2012). To reiterate, the literature’s emphasis on the context-specifi c 
PPP drivers was (unfortunately) echoed by the policy perspective in which accel-
erated PPP advancement was adopted in Kazakhstan, at least for a few years, as 
its developmental priority. Th is is why, having identifi ed gaps in the literature and 
aiming to investigate whether this policy was grounded in a sound theoretical ap-
proach, the study’s conceptual framework, which the next section delineates, rests 
on the VfM criterion.
3. A conceptual framework for analysing PPP deployment
Th is study’s approach to PPPs includes three complementary elements – the val-
ue-for-money concept, property rights theory and agency theory. Th is section dis-
cusses each element.
Th e VfM concept implies that an assessment of all PPP costs over the entire 
length of a project should be compared to the cost of government-provided public 
service. Applied to PPPs, the VfM concept means that a PPP could be deployed only 
when total PPP costs are lower than the government in-house provision, provided 
that both options deliver the same service quality (Boardman and Vining 2010). A 
PPP could be used as a method of private delivery of public services “only if a PPP 
can deliver public sector services cheaper and better, meaning with smaller costs as 
opposed to other options, and with improved quality (and other enhanced output 
features) as opposed to other options” (Mouraviev 2012, 35). In many industrialised 
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countries, VfM has become the most important, although not the only, criterion 
for PPP deployment. In addition to fi nancial reasons (i.e. aiming to economise on 
budget expenses and attract private funding), governments also pursue a broader 
political agenda by trying to get a better deal for the taxpayers (Hodge et al. 2018). 
Colman (2000) warns that if VfM is dropped as a critical criterion, the public-sector 
partners might focus on the process and reaching an agreement that is deemed ac-
ceptable, rather than the one that delivers the best deal to the taxpayer.
While researchers commonly recognise that VfM is the most important crite-
rion, they also note a range of other factors that governments should consider, for 
example the public sector’s own capability to deliver services (Morallos and Ame-
kudzi 2008), reduction of government borrowing (Sadka 2007), and the need to 
attract private fi nance to public infrastructure projects (Hodge et al. 2018). None-
theless, most researchers agree that other factors should not override VfM (Dewulf 
et al. 2012; Greve and Hodge 2013).
As part of this study’s conceptual framework, VfM is useful for assessing Ka-
zakhstan’s recent accelerated PPP deployment against the VfM criterion, which 
would help to understand what the country has achieved and whether certain ad-
justments are required.
In addition to VfM, this paper’s conceptual lens includes property rights the-
ory. Property rights refer to stakeholders’ rights to use and / or earn income from, 
and to transfer or exchange diff erent kinds of resources or assets (Libecap 1989). 
Distribution of property rights focuses on creating economic incentives to various 
parties (owners) for eff ective use of property or a part of it (Grossman and Hart 
1986; Libecap 1989; Hart and Moore 1990). Parties involved in a transaction ne-
gotiate the initial assignment of property rights in the view that this negotiation 
will yield each party the benefi t in the form of (a) the scope and extent of individ-
ual eff ort that corresponds, in the party’s perception, to its welfare maximisation, 
and (b) to the expected distribution of income (Libecap 1989; Kim and Mahoney 
2002). Transferring some attributes of resources (which is also called partitioning of 
property rights) from one party to another is at the core of property rights theory, 
and it argues that this should be done effi  ciently (Pejovich 1995; Kim and Mahoney 
2005). In relation to PPPs, discussions between the government and a private-sector 
partner refer exactly to property rights and how they could be transferred from one 
party to another. Th ese discussions focus on each party’s contribution to a proposed 
partnership and what the income distribution from the service provision might be. 
Th erefore, property-rights theory becomes a useful part of this paper’s conceptual 
framework as it aff ords an opportunity to assess the expectations that the parties 
have in negotiations about launching a PPP in terms of their rights to use resources 
and their rights to receive income from certain resource allocation.
Th e paper’s conceptual framework also incorporates the third element – agen-
cy theory, which aims to explain how contracts can be designed to minimise agency 
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costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Arrow 1985; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). Agency 
theory appears useful because it focuses on how the principal-agent relationship is 
structured ex ante, i.e. making predictions in the form of expectations from a con-
tract (Mahoney 1995; Kim and Mahoney 2002). As for PPPs, when parties negotiate 
a contract that is inevitably incomplete (because contracts are for 10 to 30 years), 
the interaction between the government (principal) and private fi rms (agents) is 
explained by agency theory by arguing that parties are seeking to minimise the con-
tractual problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Given that each party has consider-
able constraints (e.g. the governments across the globe run persistent budget defi -
cits, while private fi rms face infl exible tariff s and all kinds of risk, from construction 
risk to revenue risk), minimising agency costs can be considered a legitimate task 
for all parties involved (Miller 1992). Th erefore, the application of agency theory 
allows assessing how this task was implemented in Kazakhstan, if ever.
Adding to each other’s qualities, the three elements of the study’s conceptual 
framework aff ord an opportunity to avoid bias in the selection of a theoretical lens 
for the study of PPPs. Furthermore, their complementarity is useful for analysing 
Kazakhstan’s progress and evaluating whether the nation’s experience could and / or 
should be borrowed by other economies seeking best practice in PPP development.
4. Methodology
As the study aims to draw insights into the reasons and implications of Kazakhstan’s 
accelerated PPP development, a qualitative approach was adopted (Patton 2015). A 
qualitative approach is deemed most appropriate for this study as it aff orded the re-
searcher opportunities to investigate varying perspectives of actors in the PPP fi eld 
by capturing their opinions, perceptions and views in their own words (Flick 2018). 
Rather than putting forward a certain theory, concept or assumptions upfront, a 
researcher sought to receive a broad range of data, in the form of interview narra-
tives, on topics related to how PPPs were launched in Kazakhstan during the years 
of rapid deployment; what role regional governments played in the deployment; 
and what forms of fi nancial support to PPPs were made available by the government 
and how easy it was for the private fi rms to secure this support. Th e interviews 
were semi-structured, guided by the list topics, to ensure consistent data collection 
across the whole sample. In-depth interviews (each lasting 45 to 55 minutes) were 
conducted in 2019 and 2020 with 24 participants. As Russian is widely spoken in 
Kazakhstan, all interviews were carried out in Russian, which allowed using the 
researcher’s native language skills. Some interviews were also conducted by the re-
searcher’s counterparts, who reside in Kazakhstan.
Interviewees were from a range of organisations including:
• PPP operators (railroad, energy company, kindergarten) – 4
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• Regional and local governments – 5
• National PPP Centre – 2
• Regional PPP centres – 5
• Lawyers working in law fi rms – 3
• Private investors – 5
A broad range of organisations was useful and necessary for this study as it 
allowed avoiding potential bias in opinions or a dominant perspective, should the 
participants from one or two organisational networks form the majority.
Purposeful sampling and snowballing methods were employed to engage 
those actors who are knowledgeable in the PPP fi eld and willing to share their views 
(Atkinson and Flint 2004; Neuman 2013). Some interviewees were recruited via 
the researcher’s personal contacts, although most participants joined the study as a 
result of referral by other participants, i.e. by snowballing sampling (Patton 2015). 
Most of the interviewees were mid-level managers in their organisations as those 
in management positions usually possess broader views on the fi eld in which they 
work (see Table 1). Th e most important interviewee selection criteria were expert 
knowledge and / or practical experience in the PPP fi eld and willingness to discuss 
their experience.
Aft er a few initial interviews, the principal subthemes started shaping up. In-
terviews focused on these subthemes, while at the same time allowing study par-
ticipants to share their additional perspectives to make sure that important details 
and other views were not lost (Denzin and Lincoln 2008; Creswell and Poth 2018).
Semi-structured interviews were guided by broad topics, and all interview-
ees were asked about both the government perspective and the private investors’ 
perspective on PPP development in the country to avoid a one-dimensional (and 
possibly biased) view. Th e interview data were complemented by document analysis 
of Kazakhstan’s laws and regulations, statements of the public offi  cials, and the web-
sites of the national and regional PPP centres, which allowed ensuring data trian-
gulation. Th e relatively small sample size may be viewed as a limitation of this study 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). However, the sample size appeared appropriate as the 
researcher reached data saturation aft er approximately 20 – 21 interviews, when it 
became clear that additional interviews were unlikely to bring new fi ndings (Patton 
2015; Flick 2018). A thematic analysis was performed, making use of the chosen 
conceptual framework, which facilitated a consistent investigation of fi ndings, giv-
ing consideration to whether interview data permit to answer the stated research 
questions (Neuman 2013).
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1 Manager Regional government
2 Manager PPP operator
3 Lawyer Law fi rm
4 Expert National PPP Centre
5 Director of department PPP operator
6 Manager Regional PPP Centre
7 Expert Regional PPP Centre
8 Owner, entrepreneur Private investor
9 Entrepreneur Private investor
10 Expert Regional PPP Centre
11 Senior expert Regional government
12 Manager PPP operator
13 Lawyer Law fi rm
14 Expert National PPP Centre
15 Head of department Regional PPP Centre
16 Senior manager PPP operator
17 Expert Regional government
18 Manager Local authorities
19 Senior expert Regional PPP Centre
20 Owner, entrepreneur Private investor
21 Manager Local authorities
22 Lawyer Law fi rm
23 Manager Private investor
24 Manager Private investor
5. Results and discussion
Findings were grouped around three themes. Th ey emerged naturally, representing 
the three principal enablers of rapid PPP deployment in Kazakhstan from 2016 to 
2019:
1) availability of simplifi ed procedures for a PPP launch;
2) pressure exerted on regional governments;
3) extensive government fi nancial support to PPPs.
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Th ese enablers and entailed implications are discussed in detail below.
5.1 Streamlined and simplifi ed procedures
Procedures for PPP deployment, which were in place up to and including 2015, 
drew signifi cant criticism owing to the lack of clarity and rigidity. Legal and reg-
ulatory barriers, such as the government’s tight tariff  regulation and regulation of 
PPP workers’ wage rates, served as an impediment to private investment, and the 
number of PPP projects remained very small (Mouraviev and Kakabadse 2015b).
While by 2015 there was a marked negative impact of tangled PPP procedures 
on investors, the impact on the government was less noticed. An interviewee ex-
plained how managers and staff  in regional governments perceived unclear proce-
dures set for the PPP formation:
Some workers in regional and local authorities did not see [prior 
to 2016] any problems with the procedures. Gaps gave them fl ex-
ibility, and they could design their own procedures. But others in 
regional governments were reluctant to do something that was 
not spelled out in the guidelines. Th at was because of the fear to 
make a mistake for which they could lose a job or opportunity to 
be in the good books. And, in fact, the majority were indeed re-
luctant, rather than enthusiastic, to initiate a PPP in their region. 
(Interviewee 18)
Th e above excerpt shows the dual impact of procedures set for a PPP launch 
prior to 2016. An intent to facilitate PPP formation by off ering a standard procedure 
appeared incomplete and inconsistent. Procedural gaps and lack of clarity backfi red 
for the government, and PPP-related procedures were not viewed as useful by both 
private investors and the government workers. Th is explains, at least in part, why 
the progress made with PPP deployment in the years prior to 2016 stalled.
Th ere were multiple calls for changes in the PPP-related procedures, and 
amendments were made and aligned to the new law on PPPs adopted in 2015, 
which went into eff ect in 2016  (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Public-Pri-
vate Partnership” 2015). Th e overall change was dramatic, resulting in hundreds of 
approved projects (Chikanayev 2019a). By 1 June 2020, the total number of PPP 
contracts reached 786, out of which only 10 are at the national level (Matayev 2020).
Study participants identifi ed a number of reasons due to which PPP deploy-
ment in Kazakhstan from 2015 to 2019 became frequent, and the principal reason 
were the simplifi ed procedures designed for the approval process. Th ese include 
procedures for preparing, submitting, and reviewing PPP project proposals, organ-
ising tenders, selecting the winning bid, and many other details that facilitated the 
whole process – from an idea about a potential partnership project to its approval 
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and, ultimately, its launch. An interviewee shared his understanding of how inves-
tors perceived PPP-related procedures before and aft er 2016:
Prior to 2016 the procedures were quite unclear. Apparently, in-
vestors saw gaps and ambiguity. I remember my conversation 
with an investor who complained about the vagueness of some 
guidelines, and he noted that he was aware of other investors 
who also were unhappy with the procedures. Investors don’t like 
to see some surprises in the form of additional requirements or 
unexpected interpretation of how unclear procedures should be 
followed. Th en, in 2016, the procedures were streamlined, and it 
appeared to many that a PPP launch had become much easier. 
(Interviewee 7)
A similar opinion was expressed by another study participant:
I know a few companies that were interested in PPPs, this was in 
2014 – 2015. But they told me that the criteria for selecting a win-
ner in a tender were vague, which was to their disadvantage. Lat-
er on, the process of PPP formation was improved, became much 
clearer. Investors liked clarity and more certainty, and from the 
beginning of 2016 partnerships mushroomed tremendously. (In-
terviewee 16)
Another quote shows an important detail of exactly how a critical element of 
the PPP approval process was streamlined. It appeared that, as an alternative to se-
lecting the private sector partner via a tender, the government additionally off ered 
an option of what was called direct negotiation. A study participant explains:
Many investors took advantage of  direct negotiation, which 
seemed like a way to avoid competition with other companies 
in an open tender. In direct negotiation there were no bids, and 
everything was negotiable – what an investor agrees to do, what 
kinds of fi nancial support an investor expects from the govern-
ment, the time frame for completing diff erent stages of a project. 
(Interviewee 4)
Another study participant highlights a controversy related to direct negotiation:
One can argue that bypassing tender procedures allowed launch-
ing PPPs easier and faster. Yes, that’s true. But is it always good ? 
If there are no competing bids for a PPP contract, how do we 
know that direct negotiation allowed selecting the best investor, 
the one who off ered the largest value for money ? Th e public sector 
partner may simply hand-pick an investor for unknown reasons. 
(Interviewee 11)
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Without focusing on opportunities for corruption and whether or not they 
were used, another interviewee emphasised macroeconomic, society-wide conse-
quences of streamlined procedures, including direct negotiation for PPP deploy-
ment (broadly used from 2016 to 2019):
I’m not sure that it was a good idea to deploy so many PPPs so 
quickly. PPPs create signifi cant liabilities for the government as it 
has to reimburse most costs to private investors over a very long 
time – up to 30 years, depending on each project’s length. Direct 
negotiation further facilitated this process of rapid PPP deploy-
ment, meaning that it facilitated signifi cant increase in govern-
ment obligations to pay. (Interviewee 22)
Here, the interviewee refers to the extensive budget outlays to partnerships, 
which make many PPPs in Kazakhstan more expensive to the government compared 
to the government’s in-house provision of public services. In many of Kazakhstan’s 
concessions all PPP expenses – both capital and operating – are reimbursed from 
the budget over many years, while citizens pay nothing (Mouraviev and Kakabadse 
2017). Th is is in sharp contrast to the common practice in industrialised nations, 
where the private-sector partners’ costs are reimbursed by user fees, rather than by 
the government (Sadka 2007; Hodge et al. 2010; Reeves 2015). In Kazakhstan, direct 
negotiation as a method of PPP deployment, alongside other streamlined proce-
dures, have led to an exponential growth of PPPs, but also considerably increased 
overall budget liabilities for years to come. Th ese liabilities will need to be budgeted 
for, raising concerns about whether revenue will be available to pay for the rising 
government obligations.
5.2 Pressure on regional governments
Another reason for frequent PPP deployment aft er 2015 was pressure on regional 
and local authorities, exerted by the national government. In particular, interview-
ees emphasised that for each regional government a task to deploy a minimum of 
fi ve PPPs per year was set and was made a key performance indicator (KPI) for the 
regions and their heads. Th e following excerpt explains the signifi cance of this KPI 
for a region:
Once the task [i.e. the KPI] was set for each region, it was viewed 
as an order that came from the top. Aft er that there was no room 
for thinking hard whether to deploy PPPs. It was not optional any 
longer. (Interviewee 3)
Another study participant confi rmed that setting a KPI has had a strong im-
pact on the regional governments:
Beginning in 2016, the regional authorities changed their posi-
tion on PPPs. From being cautious and oft en reluctant to launch 
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a PPP, they switched to another extreme and kind of started to 
compete with each other as to who can form more partnerships. 
Th ey knew that the central government wanted many more PPPs 
than the handful that we had earlier. (Interviewee 19)
Th is is confi rmed by the data of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, 
which states that Kazakhstan regions were assessed based on a number of deployed 
PPPs (Atameken 2019).
Th e policy framework for active PPP development was set earlier by the Ka-
zakhstan-2050 Strategy (Nazarbayev 2012), which is Kazakhstan’s comprehensive 
long-term ambitious plan to become one of the 30 most developed world econo-
mies. Announced by the country’s then President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, this doc-
ument indicates Kazakhstan’s commitment to use PPPs for achieving its strategic 
developmental goals. Subsequently, pressure on regional governments was also ex-
erted via public statements from senior offi  cials, including Kazakhstan’s President 
and Prime Minister. For example, in October 2019 at the national government’s 
meeting on PPPs, Prime Minister Askar Mamin pointed out the need to intensify 
work on PPP deployment, emphasising that this is one of the government’s priori-
ties (PPP news 2019).
Assessing the pressure on regional governments, it is worth emphasising that 
this pressure contradicted the fundamental reason due to which a PPP is normally 
chosen as a method of public service delivery (Morallos and Amekudzi 2008). Th is 
reason is that a PPP should yield VfM, that is, a PPP should be deployed when 
the PPP’s total whole-of-life cost is smaller than the cost of in-house public service 
delivery by the public sector (Colman 2000; Mouraviev 2012). Pressure to deploy 
a certain number of PPPs without regard to each PPP’s cost eff ectively means that 
VfM was not used as the principal justifi cation for PPP deployment. Th is raises con-
cerns about the actual cost of partnerships for the nation and its population. Fur-
thermore, departure from the VfM criterion raises questions about what reasons, 
from the government’s perspective, drove extensive PPP deployment.
When asked about these reasons, interviewees pointed out two overlapping 
motives: use of the private sector’s funds, rather than the government’s budget, and 
the government’s unjustifi able expectations associated with PPP deployment. Th e 
fi ndings about these two drivers are presented and discussed below.
Reliance on private-sector funding
Referring to the period 2016 – 2019, an interviewee explained the thinking behind 
making use of the private funding:
Th e government’s thinking about PPPs switched to the discussion 
that the construction of a facility, such as a stadium, will be fi -
nanced by a private investor, rather than from the budget. And 
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aft er that the details of how exactly a PPP should be launched, 
tender procedures and other things became kind of technical, not 
really important. (Interviewee 14)
Th is opinion is shared by another study participant:
I heard many times from the government staff  that PPPs are not 
the main object of their attention because these projects are much 
like private business. Of course, there is a public sector’s contribu-
tion. But a project is viewed as essentially private investment. It 
seems that there are no serious concerns about how good the pro-
cedures are as long as they lead to a PPP launch. (Interviewee 2)
Yet another study participant provides a diff erent perspective that shows a 
change in the level of PPP governance, highlighting a shift  from the national level 
to the regional:
Prior to 2016, we [the country] had a small number of PPPs, 
and they were national-level projects, where a national ministry 
played the role of the public-sector partner. Of course, these proj-
ects attracted lots of government attention, and the government 
will keep monitoring them. But then [since 2016] the task was 
largely shift ed to the regions. And PPPs became mostly their con-
cern. (Interviewee 21)
A shift  to the regional level and its implications for a de-facto change in PPP 
deployment criteria were also pointed out in the following citation:
When a number of PPPs started growing fast [in 2016 – 2019], 
the way how each PPP was launched and whether or not it would 
deliver value-for-money became a lot less important. What was 
more important was the sheer fact that so many PPPs per year 
were launched. (Interviewee 8)
Th is confi rms the intentional nature of pressure and a change in governance, 
where the central government refocused PPP deployment from the national level to 
the regional and local levels.
Unjustifi able expectations
Th e government’s unjustifi able expectations associated with PPP deployment could 
be found in a few areas. One opinion emphasises a limited eff ort that the govern-
ment needs to make to ensure that PPPs are running successfully:
Th e government believes that it contributes land or some outdat-
ed facility, and its eff orts stop there. Th en the government expects 
a private investor to take care of the rest, and in a year or two the 
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services will be provided without any government involvement. 
(Interviewee 6)
Similarly, another study participant explains:
Many in the government are unaware that quite a few PPPs re-
ceive generous fi nancial support from the budget, in addition to 
land. So, a PPP looks like an easy and convenient option when 
the government does not contribute much, and most eff ort is re-
quired by the private investors, who will deliver public services 
instead of the government. (Interviewee 13)
Other interviewees also confi rmed that the prevailing mindset in government 
was that it does not need to do much to manage a PPP once it is launched. Th is 
misconception among government workers perhaps emerged due to the relative 
novelty of PPPs in Kazakhstan and the limited experience in their implementation. 
 In reality, governance is required throughout the whole length of a project term, as 
PPPs tend to renegotiate tariff s, oft en do not meet the deadlines, and their service 
quality may deteriorate (Hodge et al. 2010; Dewulf et al. 2012; Mouraviev and Ka-
kabadse 2014b).
Another unreasonable expectation was about alignment with the world best 
practice, such as that of members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). An interviewee explains:
Best practice of the Western nations was and is oft en used as 
justifi cation for PPPs. If we don’t have many PPPs, this creates 
an impression that our country is kind of lagging behind. And 
the thinking is that we need to do the same, launch PPPs, so that 
we can catch up to become much like many developed nations. 
(Interviewee 9)
It is worth noting that the PPP experience of many economies (e.g. Australia, 
Ireland, UK, US) has been controversial, and a number of PPPs around the world 
have not been successful, leading to the misuse of public funds (Hodge et al. 2010; 
O’Nolan and Reeves 2018). Th erefore, pointing to the positive international experi-
ence without also showing problems and failures means an unbalanced assessment 
that favours PPPs and downplays their disadvantages, which might have created a 
distorted picture of PPPs among some government offi  cials and staff .
Th e opinion about embedded government expectations is shared by another 
study participant who identifi ed “a certain pattern”:
Th e laws on concessions [of 2006] and on PPPs [of 2015] have 
been adopted but where are the PPPs ? It looks like the govern-
ment follows a certain pattern – fi rst, it passed the laws, designed 
regulations, and created PPP centres in each region. Second, it 
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tested the market conditions with a few pilot PPP projects and 
also by making use of Russia’s experience. Th ird, it now wants all 
of that to work – the government expects a large number of PPPs 
to be launched, and this is exactly what we see. (Interviewee 5)
Th is participant’s insight highlights what could be described as euphoria stem-
ming from successfully created legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks for 
PPPs, accumulated experience (since 2006), and the expectation that PPPs will dra-
matically improve the situation with public services in Kazakhstan. As by 2015 it 
seemed that all preparations had been made by the government, the expectations 
for large-scale PPP deployment were embedded in the noted governance pattern 
and then materialised in the period 2016 – 2019.
5.3 Extensive government support to PPPs
Another reason explaining the large number of PPPs deployed in Kazakhstan from 
2016 to 2019 is the high availability of government fi nancial support to partner-
ships. Th e 2006 law on concessions off ers a large variety of forms of state support to 
concessions including: government subsidies; compensation of concessionaires’ in-
vestment costs and operating expenses; payment of a rental fee for the use of a facili-
ty owned by a concessionaire; availability payment that is made to a private operator 
for keeping a facility up and running; government guarantees on private partners’ 
loans and infrastructure bonds; in-kind grants to a private partner; co-fi nancing of 
concession projects; and guaranteed consumption by the state of a certain amount 
of goods and services produced by a PPP during project implementation (Law of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Concessions” 2006). Similar forms of state support 
are specifi ed in the 2015 PPP law, article 27 (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On 
Public-Private Partnership” 2015).
Interviewees confi rmed that the vast majority of PPPs deployed from 2016 to 
2019 enjoyed one or more forms of government support, eff ectively decreasing the 
private investors’ costs. A study participant argued that:
Many PPPs received government fi nancial support and used as 
many forms as they could. Th e PPP law allows this. In fact, the 
law allows that all expenses, absolutely everything, could be re-
imbursed by the government. It would be simply foolish to not 
draw fi nancial support – the more a PPP receives, the less it has 
to pay itself. (Interviewee 12)
Another interviewee expressed his opinion that was commonly shared by the 
study participants:
Th e fi nancial support seemed abundant. It’s not surprising that 
there was a rush to launch PPPs for a few years since 2016. Some 
investors were so encouraged by the newly passed PPP law that 
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they thought it was the opportunity of a lifetime. Not only could 
the government pay some, or most, or even all project expenses, 
but it could also guarantee that it would buy all PPP services. 
Th is means that the PPP’s revenue stream could be guaranteed. 
No need to worry about selling the services or problems with rev-
enue generation in a long-term project. (Interviewee 2)
Th is excerpt explains that for some PPPs the principal kinds of risk, such 
as revenue risk and risk of non-payment, could be eliminated to a large extent or 
even completely. Th e larger the government’s payments to a PPP, the lower the pri-
vate-sector partner’s risk. Th e sheer existence of an opportunity given by the con-
cessions law that the government could off er a contractual guarantee to purchase a 
certain volume of PPP services encouraged many private investors to make use of 
this legal provision to their advantage, thereby reducing their risk but also increas-
ing the government’s obligations.
Extensive support to PPPs is also linked to the simplifi ed procedures for 
partnership formation already discussed as another reason for a large-scale PPP 
deployment. As many projects were approved by direct negotiation between an 
investor and the government, rather than by the outcomes of competitive bidding, 
it is likely that direct negotiation played a notable role in how much fi nancial sup-
port was extended to partnerships from 2016 to 2019. In the following comment 
an interviewee argues that:
If an investor presents compelling arguments that some parts or 
stages of a PPP project will cost more than the proposal says, there 
is a good chance that the government will agree to a re-designed 
proposal, with higher costs. Th e same logic applies to requests for 
government support. Prove that without certain injections [to a 
PPP] a project becomes unprofi table or simply unattractive, and 
the government will have no choice but to pay. (Interviewee 20)
A similar view is expressed by another interviewee:
Once the public-sector partner chooses direct negotiation, it ef-
fectively gives up an opportunity to run a tender. But in direct 
negotiation the government locks itself in to a degree. Talking to 
just one investor may take a long time, and if this investor walks 
away, the project goes nowhere. Th e same might happen negoti-
ating with another investor. In these conditions the government 
has to agree, at least in part, to many requests that come from an 
investor. I think in direct negotiation an investor has very high 
chances to get what it wants. (Interviewee 17)
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Many interviewees observed how various sources indicate that more than 
50 % of all PPPs were formed by direct negotiation, although offi  cial statistics are 
unavailable. While it is likely that the prime goal of direct negotiation was / is to 
speed up the PPP formation process, it had an unanticipated impact on the govern-
ment contribution to PPPs and on the overall PPP costs. In the PPP contract negoti-
ation, a private investor might be able to convince the public-sector partner to raise 
the overall project cost and the government’s contribution, such as by explaining 
certain diffi  culties and risks facing an operator or by promising a higher quality of 
services. Th e larger the project’s cost, the greater the government’s reimbursement 
of costs might be, although this link is not necessarily straightforward. Th erefore, 
due to limited competition and lack of transparency, direct negotiation has a signif-
icant potential to (a) increase the project’s cost and / or (b) increase the volume of the 
government’s support to a PPP.
All forms of government support to partnerships are still available as they are 
spelled out in both the law on concessions and the PPP law. Many interviewees 
confi rmed that fi nancial support played a very controversial role in rapid PPP de-
ployment in the country.
6. Conclusions
What happened in reality was not exactly what the government had expected. 
While in its three peak years (2017 – 2019) more than 700 PPP agreements were 
concluded, the vast majority of them are small and / or service-type PPPs in educa-
tion (e.g. kindergartens) and healthcare (Chikanayev 2019b). Compared to just fi ve 
concessions approved by Kazakhstan’s government from 2007 to 2011 (while none 
of them has been launched) and just three ongoing PPP projects as of early 2016 
(Mouraviev and Kakabadse 2017), the number of PPP contracts signed during the 
peak looks remarkable. However, was it an intended result ? In a service contract, 
a private company does not make an investment, as the contract does not require 
the construction or renovation of a facility but rather requires management and 
maintenance. Th erefore, service-type contracts raise concerns about the possible 
misunderstanding and / or misuse of Kazakhstan’s 2015 PPP law and the entire PPP 
concept. As the newly concluded PPP contracts were based on the 2015 law (keep-
ing in mind that the law on concessions was passed a while ago, in 2006), this sug-
gests that the PPP concept was stretched and was embedded in the adjusted legal 
framework, aft er 2015, in a form that includes all kinds of collaboration between the 
private and public sectors.
By itself, a stretched understanding of PPPs does not necessarily lead to their 
quick and easy formation. Certain additional factors – direct negotiation, pressure 
on regional governments, unjustifi able expectations associated with PPP deploy-
ment, and misconception about PPP governance – played a role. Th is quick and 
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easy formation created problems: experts argue that some of the earlier PPP tenders 
are likely to be challenged in the courts in the near future, owing to errors and pos-
sible misuse of the PPP mechanism (Chikanayev 2019c).
6.1 Lessons from the application of agency theory and property-rights 
theory
Applying agency theory to Kazakhstan’s rapid PPP deployment, it is worth empha-
sising the misalignment of economic incentives, likely in the pursuit of the pub-
lic-policy goal to make progress in PPP advancement (Miller 1992). While the gov-
ernment’s expectation was that its gains would exceed those of private fi rms (i.e. 
that public services are provided at a cost that the government deemed acceptable), 
this has not materialised. Rather, the understanding grew that the government pay-
ments to PPPs formed a large and rapidly increasing part of the budget, when some 
analysts raised serious concerns whether the government would be able to meet its 
obligations to PPPs in the near future, should this fast PPP deployment continue.
Th e principal-agent relationship rests on the eff ectiveness of the economic in-
centives of the contracting parties (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). In this relationship, 
these incentives are structured chiefl y (and naturally) by the principal. While in 
Kazakhstan bargaining positions of the government and of private fi rms were ini-
tially similar, allowing reaching agreements on PPPs relatively easily and quickly, it 
is worth emphasising that it was due to the government’s willingness to pay more, 
i.e. to increase its contribution to PPPs. Once the government altered its position 
in mid-2019, arguing that the private-sector partners need to count mostly on their 
own resources, which would ensure reliable revenue stream for them, the PPP de-
ployment in the country stalled. Th is allows concluding that there was a misalign-
ment of economic incentives in the fi rst place, leading to unjustifi ably speedy PPP 
development in the country. Even with monitoring in place (although monitoring 
PPP work is likely to be costly due to the high degree of complexity of their busi-
ness; Arrow 1985), the misalignment of economic incentives leads to economic and 
also societal loss (Levinthal 1988). Th is loss may manifest itself in a variety of situ-
ations. For example, the larger budget outlays to PPPs will lead to inevitable budget 
cuts for other social, educational, economic and all other projects and expenses. In 
the case of PPP failure (e.g. when a project remains uncompleted), citizens might 
not be able to receive the required quantity and quality of public services. In the case 
of project-cost overrun, the government and citizens are likely to face the need to 
pay more for public services (and for related ineffi  ciency). In some extreme cases, 
when a private-sector partner walks away in the middle of a project, citizens might 
not receive public services at all. Th e lesson from the application of agency theo-
ry is that Kazakhstan’s initial emphasis on minimising agency costs has backfi red 
in the form of the rapidly emerging need to correct the original misalignment of 
economic incentives. Th is was accomplished in Kazakhstan in 2019 by re-focusing 
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agents’ eff orts on making effi  cient use of their own resources, rather than relying on 
government contributions.
Th e study allows drawing a similar conclusion from the application of prop-
erty-rights theory. A very large number of PPP contracts concluded in Kazakhstan 
during its three peak years means that a very large volume of property rights have 
been transferred to private hands, which can be viewed as government failure to 
reach satisfactory (for the government) economic outcomes (Libecap 1989; North 
1990; Kim and Mahoney 2002). Keeping in mind that property rights’ transfer also 
means transfer of control (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995), it is unlikely that 
this was an intended outcome for Kazakhstan with its highly centralised political 
structure and authoritarian governance (see, e.g., Fauve 2015; Furstenberg 2018). 
Furthermore, as property-rights theory requires a look at the expected distribution 
of income, a large number of concluded PPP contracts means that income distri-
bution shift ed signifi cantly toward private companies in the form of guaranteed 
government payments to PPP operators for many years to come. Th is is an ongo-
ing problem in Kazakhstan. Although since mid-2019 the government shift ed the 
policy and started allowing only those PPPs where investment is fully provided by 
private fi rms, it mitigates this problem only in part – the PPP contracts already 
concluded in 2017 – 2019 still have to be honoured, and the government must meet 
its fi nancial obligations. In practice it means that a large and growing part of the 
government budget will have to be earmarked for payments to PPPs in the coming 
years, which sets signifi cant constraints for social programmes and economic de-
velopment in general.
Ineffi  cient initial allocation of property rights (Kim and Mahoney 2002), 
when the government was prepared to reimburse most of the private investors’ costs 
and which peaked in 2017 – 2019, has led to contracting outcomes that the govern-
ment itself viewed as suboptimal by mid-2019. Subsequently, it completely departed 
from its own views on how property rights and, particularly, distribution of income 
should be arranged in the proposed PPPs. Th is means that the government (a cen-
tral party in contracting negotiations) made a change toward reallocating property 
rights to increase its own benefi t, which is consistent with property-rights theory 
(Miller 1992).
Th is conclusion drawn from the application of property-rights theory echoes 
with insights into the misalignment of economic incentives, which were drawn 
from the application of agency theory. Th us, although two theories are concerned 
with diff erent goals (property rights theory – with improvements in social welfare; 
Coase 1960; Alchian and Demsetz 1973; North 1990; and agency theory – with 
minimising agency costs; Jensen and Meckling 1976), their application allowed ar-
riving at conclusions that closely align with each other. Th ese conclusions are also in 
agreement with the application of the value-for-money concept, which is discussed 
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below, focusing on identifying implications for the government, policy and inves-
tors.
6.2 The implications of rapid PPP deployment for the government and 
policy
Th e implications of Kazakhstan’s swift  PPP development include a signifi cant in-
crease in the scope and size of government liabilities; the need to reinstate the VfM 
approach to PPP formation; and the need to replace government support schemes 
to PPPs by a new project selection process. Th is section provides further details.
One implication is that overused fi nancial support to PPPs, facilitated by the 
direct negotiation of partnership contracts, led to the signifi cant increase in gov-
ernment obligations to pay. It is likely that in the foreseeable future the government 
will have to balance the need to pay PPPs with other social and economic needs, 
and allocating money to pay PPPs means that other budget expenses, including 
those for public services, may need to be reduced. At the very least, the national 
government needs to pay special attention to managing its long-term liabilities to 
private investors (e.g. by collecting information in a timely manner and making 
sure that budget revenue will suffi  ce to pay for the government obligations). Th e 
need to pay its liabilities may put the government in a challenging situation in the 
not-too-distant future.
Another implication is that the VfM approach appeared largely abandoned. 
Pressure on the regional governments was perceived by them as an institutionali-
sation of the government’s commitment to deploy PPPs on a very large scale. Study 
fi ndings show that setting a KPI for the regions to annually deploy a certain number 
of PPPs along with other kinds of administrative pressure on the regions crowd-
ed out the VfM approach. Pursuing PPP deployment, the use of the VfM criterion 
gave way to government’s opportunism, where the government’s perspective was 
that the private sector’s engagement in PPPs outweighs their costs. Here the private 
sector’s engagement refers to the use of private funding and private fi rms’ exper-
tise for building and / or upgrading infrastructure and for public-service delivery. 
To conclude, VfM needs to regain its importance as the principal criterion for PPP 
formation.
In mid-2019, Kazakhstan’s government overhauled its PPP governance. Pres-
ident Tokayev stated that PPP development went in the wrong direction, as 90 % of 
all PPP costs are government liabilities (Tokayev 2019). Th e government became re-
luctant to grant fi nancial support to partnerships, and only those PPPs that did not 
require any compensation from the budget could be deployed (Yeshimova 2019). 
Th e revised approach is aligned with the VfM criterion as the approach aims to 
signifi cantly reduce budget expenses (Colman 2000).
Furthermore, it would be useful to make changes to the legal and regulatory 
provisions that off er a large variety of forms of fi nancial support and reimburse-
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ment to the private investors. Th is would limit the potential scope and size of gov-
ernment liabilities and would reduce opportunities for corruption (OECD 2008).
In addition, yet another implication for the government refers to the need to 
replace its own support schemes to PPPs with a new project-selection process. As 
prior to mid-2019 extending many kinds of fi nancial support to partnerships was 
the government’s routine practice based on what the PPP legal framework spelled 
out (and these provisions are still in the law), phasing out the support schemes 
means a signifi cant change in governance, when the government organisations 
need to evaluate, select and approve PPP projects diff erently, using a fundamentally 
diff erent approach where standardised procedures and contracts are replaced by 
assessment on a case-by-case basis. To do this effi  ciently, the government needs to 
develop a set of new criteria, focusing on value-for-money in the PPP projects.
6.3 The implications for investors
As rapid PPP deployment has quickly transformed into a policy shift  characterised 
by the termination of government-support schemes to PPPs, there are at least three 
implications for investors, which refer to the impact on their ability to mobilise the 
private-sector funding for investment; their ability to implement a project without 
government fi nancial support; and the disincentivisation of private investors due to 
a lack of trust. Th ese three implications are discussed below.
Th e fi rst implication refers to the investors’ ability to secure fi nancing from 
the private, rather then government, sources, which means that investors have to 
come up with their own funds and, likely, with the letters from the banks certifying 
an agreement in principle to lend money to fi nance a future PPP project. Securing 
funding may be extremely challenging, as PPP projects are long-term (oft en 15 to 
20 years or longer), which entails a much higher risk for a PPP investor and for 
a bank compared to a short-term investment (e.g. fi ve years). Th is is because the 
payback period is quite lengthy, and also because risks of changes in the regulatory 
environment, exchange rate and all other business conditions are very high.
Th e second implication for investors refers to their ability to implement a PPP 
project without government fi nancial support. As without this support the risk of 
project failure signifi cantly increases, at the project screening and approval stages 
investors are likely to be subjected to scrutiny by the public-sector partners in rela-
tion to their ability to implement a project (a) in partnership with the government 
and (b) within the project’s stated terms and conditions. Extensive checks might 
occur in all areas critical for successful performance including: fi nancial statements; 
tax returns; profi les of the senior management team; technical expertise of an in-
vestor and its key staff ; completed projects; and many other details depending on 
a proposed PPP project. Although this scrutiny might produce useful data for the 
public-sector partner, private investors might view it as excessive and as an undesir-
able infringement in privacy and simply might walk away from PPPs.
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Th e third implication is in the area of incentives for private investors, look-
ing at the bigger picture of private-public collaboration. As some (and many) in-
vestors already have embedded expectations of extensive fi nancial support for the 
PPP projects from the government, investors might be disincentivised by the sharp 
decrease of government funding and might turn away from even thinking about 
investing in the infrastructure projects. Furthermore, the government reputation, 
as perceived by investors, may be tarnished due to the policy shift  from extensive 
support to no support at all. As investors typically do not welcome withdrawal of 
government support schemes, this might be viewed by investors as an indication of 
a more profound shift  within the government policy that encourages private par-
ticipation in the public infrastructure projects and private investment in general. In 
other words, investors might view the sharply reduced fi nancial support to the PPP 
projects as a signal of the broader changes that they (investors) have to anticipate. 
Lack of trust between the government and the private sector, which stems from the 
government dominance in the Soviet time, is unlikely to be reduced by changes in 
the PPP deployment mechanisms that underwent radical transformation – from 
benefi tting due to the extensive government support to receiving no fi nancial sup-
port at all.
Th e broader implication – both for the government and investors – refers to 
the need to reconsider the overall concept of PPP governance (Steijn et al. 2011; 
Alam et al. 2014). Reliance on a contract, whether it is viewed as successful or less 
so, between the public and private-sector partners is unlikely to suffi  ce, given that 
long-term contracts are inevitably incomplete, and problems between the partners 
emerge over time. To rectify these defi ciencies, moving from contractual to collab-
orative governance might deliver better results of PPP projects (Van Gestel et al. 
2012; Klijn and Koppenjan 2016; Flyvbjerg 2017).
Assessing Kazakhstan’s experience from the international perspective, a lesson 
could be drawn for those nations that are considering PPPs and might be looking for 
the ways to accelerate their deployment. Th is applies to ex-Soviet nations, such as 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as other developing economies in Asia 
and Africa. Th e lesson elucidates the need for governments to take a cautious stance 
regarding how property rights are allocated and partitioned, adopting a long-term 
perspective that would ensure that economic incentives of the contracting parties 
are balanced. Kazakhstan’s experience showed that if one set of incentives in PPPs 
prevails (e.g. when private fi rms receive disproportionally more benefi ts than the 
public sector), improvements in social welfare may be signifi cantly compromised 
(i.e. may come at a high cost for society) or not received at all. Drawing on the stages 
of Kazakhstan’s slow (prior to 2017), then fast (2017 to 2019), and then again slow 
(mid-2019 to present) PPP development, policy makers, particularly in developing 
countries, would appreciate that unbalanced economic incentives inevitably lead to 
policy shift s, aiming to alter property-rights allocation in the direction that would 
satisfy the public interest. Th erefore, policy-making would benefi t from the appli-
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cation of a balanced approach to setting economic incentives to the contracting 
parties in PPPs.
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